

The Procurement Scam:  
Are American and Israeli Militaries Integrating?

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Buried in the [House's](#) version of the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) released on Tuesday, is section 224, entitled “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative.” The provision would arguably do more to intertwine the US military with the [Israeli](#) military than the billions and billions the US taxpayer has been forced to give the Israelis.

Section 224 lays the groundwork for bilateral research and development, co-production of weapons, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and seemingly every manner of US-Israeli military-industrial complex cooperation. The US and Israel already work together heavily on missile defense, but this provision would greatly expand coordination to seemingly every area of defense tech, including AI, quantum, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber, biotech and many more. It also proposes “network integration” and “data fusion.” In other words, the US military's data could soon be the Israeli military's data *[I thought this was the case*

*already*].

If fully enacted, this proposal would provide a higher level of military-industrial integration than the US. has with any other country in the world. To be sure, the US has worked closely with its NATO partners on co-production and shared supply chains, most notably via the [Defense](#) Production Action Plan. As the number one arms dealer in the world, the US provides weapons to militaries across the globe, but that is mostly a one-way street, with the US providing weapons to foreign buyers who only occasionally make parts for those weapons themselves.

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Section 224 would be a different beast entirely. It would fuse the US and Israeli defense sectors in multiple areas vital to the battlefields of the future, like autonomous systems and cyber [warfare]. It would also bring extraordinary Israeli influence to the US beyond what it already has through the Israel lobby and its robust network of social media influencers. It would give the Israeli government the opportunity to greatly expand one of the most powerful levers of influence in US politics: jobs. By expanding or starting new production facilities like it already has in Mississippi and Arkansas, the Israeli government could boast of providing jobs on US soil, thereby securing allies among members of Congress who

represent the districts where those jobs lie [*sic*].

This unprecedented level of military integration stands in stark contrast to the traditional aid model of defense cooperation, in which Israel already stood out as the top recipient of US military assistance. As laid out in a recent [Quincy Institute](#) brief, authored by Steven Simon, this shift from an aid model to a military integration model has troubling implications, namely:

The shift will strip away the political and diplomatic oversight mechanisms that make the relationship publicly accountable, moving it from a visible annual aid vote into the opaque machinery of defense acquisition, where oversight is limited and political accountability is minimal. The result would be a defense relationship that is simultaneously deeper and less transparent.

This all comes at a time when the Israeli military has repeatedly used US weapons in strikes that have violated international humanitarian laws in Gaza, and as Israel has repeatedly violated ceasefires in the Trump administration's unnecessary war with Iran.

The enormous gulf between what most Americans want and what the president is doing when it comes to Israel and what Congress is proposing here should not be ignored. Just 30 percent of respondents to a *New York Times*/Sienna [poll](#) from mid-May [2026] believe Trump made “the right decision” to go to war with Iran, with 64 percent saying it was wrong. An Institute for Global Affairs [poll](#) released [in late May]. . . finding that “Just 16 percent say the United States should keep supplying Israel with weapons without new restrictions; 38 percent want to stop supplying weapons entirely, and another 24 percent want weapons conditioned on how they're used.”

Though slowly, tides within both parties are shifting as more and more members speak out against the growing divide between Israel's actions and America's interests [*this is all new to them, I guess*]. For example, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MA) [wrote](#) in *The New York Times* on Tuesday that, “The Democratic Party has provided reflexive and unconditional support to Israeli governments, even as their actions have increasingly undermined American interests and values.” On the Republican side of the aisle, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) and former Rep. Marjorie Taylor Green (R-GA) have openly decried the Israel lobby's corrosive influence — a stance that may have cost both of them their seats in Congress [*may have. . .*]

Amid widespread and growing public opposition to the Israeli [genocide](#) of Gaza and South Lebanon, a controversial new bill seeks to formally integrate the US and Israeli militaries like never before, making it difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins. Section 224 of the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) proposes to join the two forces together at the hip, laying the groundwork for extensive cooperation into “seemingly every manner of U.S.-Israeli military-industrial complex cooperation,” according to the Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

This includes the research, development and production of modern, hi-tech arms, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, drones, directed energy, cyber and autonomous weapons systems. It would compel the United States to integrate Israeli arms and technologies into its defense supply chain, and fuse the countries' data-capturing and storage facilities together, meaning that Israel could have access to essentially all the US military's data. The bill also requires the creation of a new position within the Department of Defense: an executive agent whose role is to coordinate cooperation and integration between the two parties.

This would dramatically change the relationship between the two states, from one where Washington supplies Tel Aviv with money, weapons, and diplomatic support, to a situation where the two are fundamentally intertwined [*this sounds like a distinction without a difference*]. It would also make the relationship far less transparent, as aid to Israel currently requires an annual public debate and vote. However, by moving it away from the political realm into that of defense acquisition, oversight and accountability mechanisms will be removed, and the public will have little right to know the details going forward.

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Judging by its sponsors, Section 224 has strong support on Capitol Hill. It was put forward by Mike Rogers (R-AL), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Adam Smith (D-WA), the panel's highest-ranking Democrat. In late May, Rep. Ro Khanna's effort to revoke the provision from the massive military funding bill failed, paving the way for the NDAA to advance to a full House vote. The news that a new bill could essentially fuse together the US and Israeli militaries has been met with pushback online, but provoked little comment in Washington, DC.

Kentucky Congressman Thomas Massie famously spoke

up, who has promised to offer an amendment to strip Section 224 from the bill on the House floor. “We are a sovereign country,” he said recently. Massie, a strong critic of US support for Israel, recently lost his primary to challenger Ed Gallrein, after AIPAC and other Israel Lobby groups flooded the race with tens of millions of dollars [*\$15 million, last I checked*], making it the most expensive contest in American history. Analysts have noted that, if passed, the bill will “extraordinarily” expand Israeli influence in domestic American politics, giving Tel Aviv the opportunity to pull powerful political levers through the tried and tested method of offering jobs [*I'm not sure that would be new*].

The US already provides Israel with enormous amounts of military aid, having sent hundreds of billions of dollars worth of weapons [*among other things*] since 1948. Since 2008, it is required by law to protect Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” by supplying it with advanced weaponry. Section 224, however, would transform and deepen this relationship, making it all-but-impossible to democratically break the US-Israel “special relationship.”

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That alliance is under increased scrutiny, as support for Israel is collapsing across the US. A new poll published by Israel's Institute for National Security Studies found

that 60 percent of Americans (including 75 percent of respondents under 30 years old) hold a negative view of the country. When asked, a large plurality says that Israel holds too much sway over American politics and politicians. A 2025 study found that half of American voters believe Israel is carrying out a genocide against its neighbors in West Asia [*this is not a matter of “belief”*]. The International Criminal Court [*sic*] has issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant, among others, on charges of crimes against humanity.

The United States, however, has refused to accept the ICC's actions, attempted to shut down proceedings, and imposed sanctions on the court. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan stated that Senator Lindsey Graham. . . told him that his court is only “for African thugs like [Russian president Vladimir] Putin. It is not for democracies like Israel and the USA.” The response from the governments of Israel and the US to the increasing opposition to the genocide has been to crack down on dissent and to censor social media.

As Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO of the Anti-Defamation League stated, “We really have a TikTok problem, a Gen Z problem.” The Trump administration forced through the sale of TikTok to the family of Larry Ellison, a passionately pro-Israel tech billionaire who is the largest

private funder of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Ellison, no doubt, will support Section 224. Yet the effective merger between the US military and the IDF will have profound consequences for the future of America, and should provoke stiff opposition nationwide. Whether it passes will depend largely on the nature and scale of that opposition.

The post-2028 US-Israel defense [relationship](#) will likely be recast to reduce its political profile. The annual aid vote, one of the most predictably contentious moments in future US foreign-policy debates, may fade away, replaced by procurement decisions that attract little public attention and even less organized opposition. Israeli officials will be able to claim, accurately in formal terms, that Israel no longer receives American aid. American officials will be able to defend the spending as investment in US readiness rather than largesse to a foreign partner.