

Nuclear War in the Geopolitics of Sergei Karaganov

Presented by Sven Longshanks and Matthew Raphael
Johnson
Radio Albion
May 14, 2026

[Drago Bosnic]

On April 23, the [Finnish](#) government submitted a proposal to the parliament that would allow the import and storage of nuclear weapons on its territory. The document states that the country's Cabinet of Ministers has proposed amendments to its Atomic Energy Act and Criminal Code. However, the Act hides a far more sinister intent, as the Finnish Ministry of Defense clearly stated that “legislative restrictions on the import of nuclear explosives into Finland, as well as on their transport, delivery and storage within its territory, will be removed if such activities are related to Finland's defense, NATO's collective defense or defense cooperation.”

Russia cannot simply ignore the deployment of nuclear weapons along its borders, particularly when it comes to increasingly hostile nations such as Finland. Helsinki has been directly involved in the mysterious drone attacks that keep hitting Russian oil refineries and depots, particularly

around St. Petersburg. It should be noted that both Poland and the Baltic states are also directly involved in these attacks, as Kiev cannot reach Russian airspace from that direction without the aforementioned countries willingly allowing it. Worse yet, Warsaw itself is now also directly involved in simulating nuclear strikes on both Russia and Belarus.

France and Poland are conducting joint drills on precisely such attacks, specifically involving nuclear-capable Dassault Rafale fighters. Worse yet, Paris and Warsaw are reportedly working on a separate nuclear sharing agreement that would allow the Polish Air Force to equip its F-16s and upcoming F-35s with French nuclear weapons. The latest deployment of Rafales is most likely related to these plans, demonstrating that a new nuclear sharing mechanism is being put in place alongside the existing one.

[This is Karganov's article]

The current stage of the West's war against Russia may be ending, but it lasted longer than it should have. Russia has so far lacked the decisiveness needed for active nuclear deterrence, the only solution to the 'European problem' that again threatens us, but the Special Military Operation (SMO) has stimulated Russia's development. Russia has roused itself. Patriotism and national pride have increased

immensely, the value of serving the Motherland has been recognized, the people are displaying their best qualities, the economy and scientific research have revived. The most important professions—engineers, scientists, officers, skilled workers, medics, and teachers—have finally been recognized as such.

Drawing the west's fire upon ourselves, we have used it to undermine the comprador bourgeoisie and its servants in the intelligentsia. Portuguese colonialists coined the term “comprador” in reference to local traders who worked for them. Due to the reforms of the 1990s, we allowed this sector to reach unhealthy proportions. It is good that the process of cleansing Russia has been launched by the SMO without harsh repressions. Regrettably, the incipient societal and economic recovery has come at the cost of the lives of tens of thousands of valiant warriors. To them—eternal gratitude and remembrance. And if, or rather when, the unfinished war resumes, we must not allow such sacrifices again.

In 2013, I warned (much more sternly than before) a group of European leaders that dragging Ukraine into the EU and NATO would lead to war and millions dead. I clearly remember how they dared not look me in the eyes, instead staring at the floor, and then resumed prattling about the benefits of expanding the “area of democracy, trust, and human rights.” They wanted another forty

million white slaves; which they partly got, in the form of several million Ukrainian refugees.

They spoke of the need to contain Russia, even though it was still quite accommodating at the time. Unfortunately, our response to NATO's 2011 aggression in Libya was muffled. So now we are paying for the long years of appeasement, our attempts to please them, and the comprador nature of part of our elite.

By reincorporating Crimea in 2014 and sending troops to Syria in 2015, we temporarily retarded the EU's military adventurism, but then we carelessly relaxed. If our ultimatum for an end to NATO expansion had been made in 2018-2020, and backed up with strengthened nuclear deterrence, the current war could have been avoided, or at least it would have been much less bloody and lengthy. 2022 revealed that the West and the Ukrainian junta had been intensively preparing for war.

3.

There are many people in Ukraine, primarily in its eastern and southern regions, whom we can call a kindred people, but the core of the Ukrainian population—mainly to the west of the Dnieper—is a different people. They have a different history, different cultural codes and a strong anti-Russian orientation that was cultivated by the Austro-

Hungarians, Poles and other western countries. Russia requires reasonable isolation from the Ukrainian and European maladies, and should chart and follow an independent path of healthy and sound development.

Today, we are winning the war, but continue to provide muffled responses to open aggression like piratical seizures of our ships, threats to close straits, attempts to organize an economic blockade, strikes on oil terminals, and attacks (with the encouragement or at least covert support of the Euro-elite) on our oil tankers. We respond to these and similar provocations, and to attacks on our cities, with intensified bombardment of targets in Ukraine. But this will not solve the problem. Ukraine was deliberately thrown into the fire of war so that the flames would burn us. Ukraine's people are of no consequence to the Europeans, and the war will continue with greater or lesser intensity until the elimination of its source, and the source of other conflicts—the European elite, which is degrading intellectually, morally and materially. In a bid to prevent the inevitable collapse of the beneficial status quo to which they are accustomed, they are fomenting war on the subcontinent, refusing to understand that they risk its destruction.

We have not yet destroyed, as we did in 1812-1815 and 1941-1945, the hostile coalition facing us, nor broken its will to aggression. The fight has entered its intermediate

stage. The western backed remnants of Ukraine will continue to generate instability and terrorism, if a bit less intensively. The economic war against us will not stop. Europe is preparing for a new clash, and will probably use (not necessarily using Kiev) the remnants of the Ukrainian army, reinforced and reequipped, along with forces from Europe's poorer countries.

Russia will have to respond militarily to the inevitable provocations and breaches of any agreements. In reality, open aggression against us will likely resume. Most sanctions will remain in place, but Russia's strategy in that war should differ from how Moscow is waging the present one. The continued American withdrawal from Europe, and total exit from the conflict, should be facilitated through fierce deterrence and through the destruction of Europe's elite (who grasp at their fading power by inciting hostility towards Russia, fooling their own people, and escalating the conflict).

4.

The [European](#) elite can be stopped only by demonstrating our actual readiness to conduct (initially conventional) strikes against the control centers, critical infrastructure and military bases of those European countries that play a key role in preparing and executing military operations against Russia. Priority targets should also include the

places where the elites (including of nuclear powers) live and work. Let their capitals finally sober up.

If conventional strikes have no effect, and Europe does not capitulate or at least retreat, we should be fully prepared (militarily and, most importantly, politically and psychologically) to launch limited (but sufficient for political effect) retaliatory strikes with strategic nuclear weapons. Our non-strategic and strategic nuclear forces should be developed accordingly. Naturally, nuclear strikes should be preceded by several volleys of conventional tactical missiles.

Even during the Biden administration, the US received and understood Russia's signals that the war in Ukraine risks nuclear escalation (including attacks on American bases). Now the Americans are trying to wash their hands of the conflict. Trump has offered seemingly peaceful solutions. These are worth trying, to give peace the chance to heal the wounds inflicted by the long war.

5.

Russia can try to establish limited economic cooperation with the Americans where it is obviously beneficial, but without any illusion that this promotes peace. Contrary to the myths of naive Marxists and their intellectual siblings – the liberal economists – economic interests are

secondary in determining national policy. In serious confrontations, especially war, they inevitably yield to geopolitical, military-strategic and ideological considerations.

Trump's peace proposals are not aimed at lasting peace. If I were the American president, what would I do? Clearly, in maintaining a slow-simmering conflict that weakens Russia and distracts it from internal development and from Greater Eurasia (especially China). The Russo-Chinese alliance is already a prevailing force in the world. I would also play on residual pro-western and pro-European sentiment in the Russian elite and society, to prevent Russia from becoming an intellectually, spiritually and economically sovereign country.

Russia cannot allow ourselves to get bogged down in an endless conflict, similar to, but worse than the Israeli-Palestinian one. Our past mistake must be quickly corrected by drastically increasing our reliance on nuclear deterrence in Europe. Its elites must be not only contained, but intimidated. At present, they only give the appearance of fearing us, so as to build up their military strength, but they should *actually* fear us. They should understand that escalating or even continuing the conflict risks their immediate physical destruction, and that a military buildup is pointless, as it will entail an obliterating nuclear response. Our previous restraint in

using nuclear weapons has proven maliciously counterproductive, playing into the hands of those who fan militaristic hysteria and Russophobia and who prepare for war.

Restraint also amounts to a great power's evasion of its responsibility to prevent conflicts that could potentially escalate into a humanity-ending Third World War. Caution now borders on irresponsibility. Russia should amend our military doctrine to mandate the use of nuclear weapons in any war unleashed by a powerful enemy. It is high time, to abandon the Gorbachev-Reagan-era view that “there can be no winner in a nuclear war,” which contradicts all military logic and has led, among other things, to NATO's present war against Russia.

Of course, I am not calling for a nuclear war. Even if it was victorious, it would be a great sin, but we must be fully prepared for it, so that inaction and indecision do not lead to the crime of continuing a military campaign that is exhausting our country and our people. Such a crime would be a sin even less forgivable—and, more importantly, it would be a mistake.